In this year of the Rat, no bookmaker, clairvoyant or great economist had predicted that a virus called by the INRS of Coronavirus MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus), a small pathogen belonging to the family of Coronaviridae (beta-coronavirus) would damage the entire world economic system. It is clear that for France, six years after the suspicion of an Ebola case on Reunion Island, the points noted relating to hospital insufficiencies such as those for the management of storage and logistical supplies of basic equipment for support for any crisis, remain crucial points for which « sticking plaster » solutions have been taken.
However, pathogens represent a risk to human health and safety, in terms of safety and biological safety. It’s therefore in the name of the principle of legal certainty, pillar of the institutions and guarantor of a fair legal system, that environmental risks were at the heart of the Aarhus Convention of June 25, 1998[1],by enshrining three fundamental rights[2] for citizens and associations.
It’s also in this same logic as to reduce these biological health risks, while allowing progress in science and research, France, a pioneer in risk management[3], had adopted in 2001 an updated regulatory framework in 2010[4] on highly pathogenic Micro-Organisms and Toxins (M.O.T). This made it possible to insert from 2001 into the public health code two appendices recognizing dangerous viruses[5] likely to one day trigger a government plan called « Pirate-NRBC[6] ».Inspired by Biotox sheets[7] designed for practitioners (former BIOTOX plan), the principle of health biosecurity was implicitly recognized without being enshrined and inserted in the environmental code.
However, twenty-two years after the Aarhus Convention, currently being modified[8], nineteen years after the establishment of the MOT framework updated one year after the H1N1 flu episode managed by Ms. Bachelot’s ministry, the Ebola episode in 2014 on Reunion Island and in 2020 the covid-19 pandemic, there is no denying that it is a health security strategy in the event of an accidental pandemic, failure to trigger a device, and badly handled environmental information.
Beyond the individual and emotional reflections imposed by confinement, there are more technical collective questions about the capacities of States to reason in terms of management and information on major environmental risks.
For France, the right of access to administrative documents and therefore to environmental information held by the authorities has just been enshrined by the Constitutional Council[9] in the name of article 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (DDHC) of 1789. Already consecrated by the Council of State in 2002[10] in the name of public freedoms, this information is now supposed to be « communicable without time limit ».
This represents a major advance, thus entering into the evolution of the Aarhus Convention[11] and allowing this year 2020, to be a tipping point to move towards a bio-responsible global vision. Particularly in terms of biological safety and security, and therefore health. Through dialogue and reason.
It is therefore a question of taking a benevolent look for current and future generations on the operating methods observed. In terms of the identification of major environmental risks, in particular health risks, on the one hand, and on the other, in terms of new strategies to suggest
I- Crossed views on the identified identification of major health risks and the devices deployed
It’s not unreasonable to assess the national and international strike force capacity applicable in the event of a global pandemic following the events of SRARS-CoV, MERS-CoV or those caused by the H1N1 viruses, and other H5N1 avian flu. However, some[12] warned of this danger in the aftermath of SRARS-Cov[13]. Despite this, the suspicions of such a scenario have not been genuinely and correctly assessed in a transverse manner. The question is why.
A- Flagrance of the non recognition of the major accidental health risk
The XXth century saw great waves of global infectious viral pandemics like the Spanish flu[14] and its 40 million deaths, the first appearance of the H1N1 virus in China in 1918 and its famous victims[15], the Asian flu in 1956 by the H1N1 and H2N2 viruses and its 4 million victims, the Hong-Kong flu[16] by its H3N2 virus and its 1.5 million victims. And the 21st century has known for 20 years, the SARS epidemic[17] and that of the H1N1 virus in 2009[18]. Africa alone recorded 3 major epidemics between 1969 and 2014: Lassa Fever in Nigeria in 1969, the epidemic of bacterial meningitis in 2009 and that of Ebola in 2014.
We have therefore lived for centuries with permanent health risks.
And we are far from the great medieval epidemics of smallpox, plague and measles thanks to scientific advances which have enabled them to be neutralized by means of vaccines. However, it is important to remember one important thing: these pandemics were accidental, sectoral and quickly neutralized by a vaccine. The Covid-19 is a first exception. There will be others. It is therefore necessary to quickly review the flaws in terms of expertise by understanding the expertise methods traditionally used.
1- Methods of expertise traditionally used observations
Regarding Covid-19, it should be remembered that this type of virus is part of a large family including viruses responsible for simple colds but also, the best known, SARS induced by the SARS-CoV virus. The INRS tells us that « the Coronavirus MERS-CoV is a particular strain never identified in humans, which appeared in 2012 in Saudi Arabia and has not yet been classified» . It is therefore a natural pathogen whose reservoir remains the animal and the man. This form of infectious influenza remains seasonal for the WHO[19]. And the seasonal flu kills each year in France between 10,000 and 15,000 fragile people per year against 36,000 in the United States[20]. Without endangering the global economic system.
It’s therefore in this logic that any new accidental pandemic remains appraised from the standpoint of the exceptional, rare event. And can be neutralized. And the Covid-19 was initially assessed in this way.
The idea of intentional (non-accidental) pandemics linked to acts of war or terrorism is not new. Seventy years after the massacre of hairy people with mustard gas during the First World War, the idea resurfaced in peacetime after the chemical massacre of the inhabitants of Halabja (Iraq) in 1988. It is therefore to compensate for this typology of pandemics that was adopted in 1992 by the United Nations[21]a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction. Three years later, the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo metro plunged the world into new thinking, which resulted in the creation of a global state response system called CBRN device.[22] or NRBC device[23](France). This efficient and reactive system is therefore based on the identification of any threat, intentional in terms of terrorism, chemical, nuclear or biological. Each service with a mission of public safety and tranquility (Army, fire brigade, police, gendarmerie) has therefore been provided with a specific NRBC cell.
As a result, the global health pandemic caused by Covid-19 remains an accidental and unintended threat. This threat, not listed in the aforementioned device, therefore does not fall into the category of threats allowing the triggering of CBRN type security devices or other prevention plans.
2- strategies adopted until 2020 observations
We must remain humble and observe that this error remains global. Because it is based on a predefined logic. Without a real global health strategy. Europe therefore remains far from the rhetoric on the subject (Schengen, GDPR, etc.). Even though the European Central Bank (ECB) has understood the extent of the economic impact of the pandemic. The same goes for our American, Russian and Indian friends. The question therefore remains how the states will organize themselves after the end of this crisis. What about the « Day After »?
To answer it, we must first understand that major health pandemics are accidental in nature that we have hastily cataloged as “rare” and that as such, we have not really retained their management in current security measures. Is it out of ignorance or through voluntary forgetting? Because States have all accepted wrongly or rightly that their economic systems are based on a logic stemming from the post-war risk-benefit theory to assess their risks from the angle of this theory retained in the legal mechanism of reparation damage. We trivialized all the risks[24] since 1989[25] .. To repair at least, for the sake of economy and profitability. And this logic is found in hospital logistics in particular. Environmental risks demonstrate the flaw of this « profitability strategy » in weakening all economic sectors. Faulty logistics on protective equipment … at a time of society digitized excessively. This trivialization has limited the impact force of environmental risks, particularly health risks, on the economic level, in the event of a major accidental pandemic. And the experience of Covid-19 should allow us to reflect on this because who can predict that this health risk too quickly described as « exceptional » will not happen again soon? Especially in the light of global warming and the thawing of glacial zones teeming with unknown pathogens.
B Status of the devices deployed resulting from the identification adopted
The pandemic chronology of the past two centuries reminds us that we live with permanent health risks. And that the major accidental pandemic risk had been foreseeable since 2001 without, however, the States through their specialists and great contemporary strategists, civil and military experts, having anticipated its management in order to compensate for dangerous economic deviances. So the world may have played Russian roulette. For the sake of profitability and to the detriment of the principle of safety and security. Finding existing systems in the event of an accidental major health pandemic is simple and existing systems in the event of an intentional major health pandemic could also have their limits.
1- Existing systems in the event of an accidental major health pandemic observations
The World Health Organization has established the main infectious threats since the start of the 21st century and the collaborative mechanisms to combat them[26] Through three international public health tools: the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Vaccination (GAVI) created in 2000, the International Health Regulations (RSI) in 2005 and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIP Framework) in 2011. It also has a global epidemic alert and action network (GOARN), a technical inter-institutional collaboration mechanism to quickly identify and confirm epidemics of international concern. The International Health Regulations are therefore a legally binding agreement to protect the world community from risks to public health and public health emergencies that extend beyond borders. And the Preparedness Framework remains a plan to improve the responses chosen in the event of a pandemic flu. Which was used in particular for the management of the H5N1 virus.
However, despite this, if we look at the existing systems in the event of an accidental major health pandemic, the observation can be confusing: there would really be none. Despite the aforementioned international tools, this typology of disasters would never have been the subject of the smallest scale capable of measuring the intensity of health phenomena like those existing for natural phenomena[27]. Nor would it have been the subject of conduct guides, manuals for health professionals similar to those existing in existing disaster medicine, particularly in France since 1994[28] , or in medicine in elite RAID-type services[29].
Nor would it have been the subject of specific RETEX-type exercises for France, which could have made it possible to improve emergency planning within the framework of adapted ORSEC-type plans such as those provided for natural disasters since 2004[30].
Finally, for France, it has not been the subject of any opinion from the Directorate General of Civil Security and Crisis Management (DGSCGC), replacing since 2014 the Central Security Commission (CCS)[31].
Whereas since January 1, 2014, the DGSCGC rubs shoulders with the General Directorate of Local Authorities, the General Directorate of the National Police, and the General Directorate of the National Gendarmerie) and the purchasing, equipment and Internal Security logistics (SAELSI), common to the general directorates, ensures the purchase and management of equipment stocks. And that the DGSCGC has under its tutelage the National Superior School of Fire Brigade Officers (ENSOSP).
The emergency measures adopted without a real security strategy by each country will certainly have had the merit of existing, but will probably all be criticized in the post-deconfinement period. Because the question that will arise will lie in the coming months on the reasons for this absence when the States have means of response and specialized services. So is this a major systemic flaw? The answers are threefold.
The first answer that we could give rests first of all on the rare and sectorized nature of this typology of risks which, it should be remembered, had always been neutralized by means of vaccines and sectoral eradication. As can be seen in the twelfth general program of WHO. The organization relies only on prevention, preparation and intervention activities. Covid-19 remains an exception, because from a sectoral phenomenon, it has rapidly transformed into a pandemic phenomenon thanks in large part to air and sea transport.
The second answer that we could formulate is more economical. We thought wrongly about the improbable operational perfectibility of China, a global supplier of drugs and equipment, hitherto operational in all weathers and whose main logistics province has been paralyzed. The current world economy remains closely dependent on China and no one had anticipated that China could be paralyzed and that this paralysis would impact the international economic and societal pan.
The third answer that we could retain is more strategic. It is based on the observation of non-transversal expertise of this risk in terms of five factors: the global health status, the international will, the global configuration, the international players and the operational organization to be retained. Even if this is redundant, the first factor has not taken into account the existence of this risk for nineteen years. The other three factors demonstrate that the “accidental”, therefore “unintentional” and “exceptional” nature of this major health risk was ultimately not taken into account. This therefore explains why the fifth factor was so poorly operational.
2- Flaws in existing systems in the event of an intentional major health pandemic
Without making a tedious description, it should be recalled that a major accidental health pandemic remains an unintentional threat which does not trigger on the international level as does national law the NBC device only applicable in the event of intentional threats (acts of terrorism ) nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical. Yet for the latter, France has demonstrated that it is capable of carrying a “national doctrine of the use of emergency means”, in particular with regard to major chemical risks[32].. As part of this system, since 2014, the National Civil and Military Center for training and training in nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical and explosive events has appeared (CNCMFE)[33]. Based in Aix en Provence, the latter has had objectives for 6 years to « participate in the definition of the interministerial training and training policy in the NRBC-e fields, to develop a pedagogy allowing the implementation of joint procedures .. […], implement inter-ministerial training for high-level officials as well as ministerial advisers from the defense and security zones, implement inter-ministerial training .. […], set up technological watch and conducts technical and operational studies and experiments, contribute to European and international expertise to formation in the area of its competence[34]». This center finances joint training (EIZ) for the seven defense zones. And works on sessions shared with disaster medicine specialists such as the French Society of Disaster Medicine (SFMC) and the National School of Fire Brigade Officers (ENSOSP)[35] .
However, three observations about this system: the first is based on too few common exercises[36] which could allow the decompartmentalization of the device. The second poses the question of the lack of appeal to these specialists with the covid-19 pandemic: the scientific committee set up since March 11th is not staffed with field specialists in disaster medicine, or civilian specialists and NRBC soldiers, or at major risk. The third is based on its own limits. Especially in terms of logistics and equipment. Because this joint, interministerial and interallied system, endowed with sophisticated means of detection, sampling, recognition and means of modeling and decontamination has been the subject of feedback from its own specialists, who are reflecting. And if we take the example of the NRBC device specific to the French Army, as a corollary to the National Civil and Military Center for training and training in nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical and explosive events (CNCMFE), was created five months later the Joint Center for Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical Defense (CIA NRBC), located at Saumur[37]. Whose main mission was to guarantee armies mastery of defense capabilitiesNRBC[38]. As NRBC referent expert with the armed forces. This center would therefore bring its expertise in the assessment of the level of operational readiness of specialized NRBC defense units for 6 years. And the DGA’s mission would therefore be based on “NRBC control” thus including expertise in the field of biological (B) and chemical (C) risks, expertise and evaluation of NRBC defense systems, expertise and evaluation of the hardening B and C of equipment, expertise in the field of combating the proliferation of B and C weapons, expertise in the field of depollution and destruction of chemical weapons.
However in March 2017, Colonel Laurent GIOT, commander of the CIA – NRBC already deplored the material shortages, internal management difficulties and the interconnection of services: « One of the most frequent negative REBC NRBC TTA points concerns the equipment protection: in addition to recurrent management difficulties, they are considered to be a lower priority than other equipment and therefore, even the masks do not systematically benefit from air transport and are then transported by boat, thus being able to arrive several weeks after the staff they can protect and leaving well before them [39]».
More eloquent, this military expert courageously evoked the Sentinel system deployed in the aftermath of the 2005 State of emergency, in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, and then specified: « Since the start of Operation Sentinel, the first responders on an NRBC event in a large urban area is potentially any army unit. This assertion goes against everything that is taught in interdepartmental where the first responders are the firefighters and the internal security forces (ISF); the call to the armies arriving only later, as a last resort, when the “4 i rule” 3 applies. With Sentinel, the configuration is different and Army soldiers may find themselves newly arrived at the scene of an attack with an NRBC dimension. In addition, in such a case, they would be one of the few responders who quickly have at least a mask, or even a full NRBC protective suit, and would be among the even rarer trained and trained responders …. [.. .] »
same situation to a National Gendarmerie and Police. While a NRBC certification (nuclear, radiological, bacteriological, chemical) of the European Voluntary Reserve has been created and that currently, it would seem that only France has had a certified cell since 20171 allowing them to have efficient means and to help populations in the best possible way. However, this system is not coupled with adaptable transport logistics in times of crisis.
As for major risks, their management for France is based on three phases: preparation phase (planning, training, anticipation), operational phase and return to normal phase (feedback, support from the population, etc.). Documents relating to the Civil Security response organization (ORSEC), the specific intervention plan (PPI), the municipal backup plan (PCS) and the exercises and feedback are online. However, a major health pandemic has not been accepted as a major natural risk. There is therefore no ORSEC-Pandemic health plan, whereas since 1987, the legislator has retained fires as major risks[40]. Before to create in 1995[41] natural and technological risk prevention plans (PPR). This finding is all the more alarming that despite the M.O.T introduced in the public health code since 2001, no provision specific to major health risks has been able to appear in 19 years in the environmental code (Article L561-1) still does not have a paragraph devoted to this risk and Article L562-1, paragraph I, however modified in 2012[42] has only retained that « The State draws up and implements plans for the prevention of foreseeable natural risks such as floods, ground movements, avalanches, forest fires, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, storms or cyclones .. […] ».
These systemic flaws reflect an underestimation of the environmental risks, in particular health risks for which the experience of Covid-19 must react to glimpse new strategies.
II- Typologies of strategies for the future
The report being drawn up, that to retain if it is only that France like the rest of the world does not have in 2020, a plan of prevention and security alert of major accidental health risks. This observation in domestic and international law remains identical, in total contradiction in the age of globalization, the acceleration of modes of transport, modes of production, and the digital society. Several proposals can be retained, in particular by suggesting through the dialogue to rethink the risks transversally by pleading for a truly safe approach based on a new iterativity and focused on endemic issues.
A- Suggestions for structural strategies based on a bio-responsible legal vision
1- Suggestions for another iterative operational interconnection strategy
The first suggestion concerns iterative operational logistics in terms of adaptable transport in the event of a pandemic, both intentional and accidental, which may represent a risk of the spread of a pandemic. Here, sovereignism could logically be one of the great “winners” of a pandemic, in the sense that we would control the flow of borders, we would then refocus the strategy from two angles: an economic first around local agriculture, d ” protection of economic poles. A second hospital around a solidarity emergency health organization through the strengthening and enlargement of systems such as that of« Know Your Patient[43] », which could allow the absence of a shortage of equipment in the event of a major pandemic threat. This first strategy would therefore be interactive on the operational level and thus anticipative, transversal (private-public) and iterative (civil-military). It would avoid falling into the trap of disaster scenarios like S.A.R.R.A where artificial supervision would direct operations in place of collective human intelligence[44]. It would also prevent us from falling into that of systematic tracking where individual freedoms would be jeopardized. However, we must remain humble because the challenge remains great for the establishment of such a dispositif. And be careful because you have to seriously consider that catastrophic scenarios as described above would not be unfounded if nothing was done. It is therefore not unreasonable to think that no State can today, like tomorrow, claim to be immune to such an event. And that he must learn a lesson from the Covid-19.
2- Suggestion of another cross-cutting security interconnection strategy
To the first suggestion is added a second strategy of security interconnection which must not be based on an irrational strengthening of the State, as in any security crisis – war, terrorism, epidemic – whose role would be valued for the control of populations , economic intervention, health and safety. But on the principle of legal certainty. To gently strive towards a bio-civilization that does not yet exist. Because after confinement, there is no doubt that there is a risk of witnessing national and international confrontation between four categories of population: the first brings together those who argue the risks in their most negative fatalistic setbacks. The second brings together those who counter them.
The third brings together finally those who will live “compartmentalized” through tools such as telework, telemedicine, tele-education. The fourth will bring together all those who do not adhere to the first three. The first category was noticed in particular in the United States. end of March 2020 through the explosion of arms and ammunition sales The second category also by advocating the return to individual self-sufficiency. The third saw its privileges shared for the benefit of the fourth.
Faced with this observation, it is necessary to think differently to reason with humility and benevolence both in order to allow the tilting of current society towards a responsible bio-civilization. Here, this strategy would be based on a reasoned security interconnection based on the recognition of a new type of liberalism: bio-liberalism. Placing Human and Nature at the center of the state economy. A bio-responsible governance circle. We are therefore in an approach of responsible bio-civilization where environmental democracy is at the center. And where dialogue tools like mediation will have a big role to play[45]. France could be a pioneer in this new bio-responsible security strategy, which could ally itself with the American strategy validated by President Trump in April 2020, known as the « shock strategy »[46] » which is based on the limits of neoliberalism by highlighting the achievements of civilizations, political and cultural values to counter capitalist attempts to use natural disasters, crises and disasters to impose new constraints.
B- Suggested organizational strategies based on a bio-responsible legal vision
1- Suggestion of a strategy based on organizational interconnection
This third suggestion can then overlap with the first two strategies, which is based on a transversal interaction of all the services mentioned above, trained in particular in disaster medicine, CBRN, as well as major risks. First, by extending them to accidental major pandemic risks. To allow existing systems to integrate this exponential environmental risk. To better prepare the players in terms of human and material logistics, quickly and operationally, in particular hospital[47].
Then by transversely pooling the human capacities of each elite unit through a common national platform that does not yet exist. Which would include the aforementioned 4 Directorates-General and would then be rolled out on a European and global level. For a harmonious international interconnection. Because let there be no mistake, by examining the strategies specific to disaster medicine, major risks and CBRN systems, there are points of convergence that could serve as leverage for new innovative strategies. Very operational. Finally, by making this platform accessible by level of confidentiality by State, to the general public, on behalf of the principle of access to environmental information for the general public, a pillar of the Aarhus Convention. However, this typology of innovative ideas remains blocked for the moment, in particular by the Defense Innovation Agency (AID), attached to the Ministry of the Armed Forces, self-proclaimed “expert referent”. Chaired by a civilian, doctor in biomathematics, specialist in questions on artificial intelligence and military simulation[48], the call for projects of March 23, 2020[49] of this agency focused on « innovative solutions to fight COVID-19 » to « have proposals to fight against the COVID19 pandemic … […] the search for innovative solutions, whether technological, organizational, managerial or adaptation of industrial processes, which could be directly mobilized in order to: protect the population, support patient care, test the population, monitor the evolution of the disease at the individual level and the ‘evolution of the pandemic, or helping to limit constraints during the crisis period ». The call for projects even specified that these projects must « be of sufficient technological maturity to be employable during the current pandemic. These innovative solutions must be easily and quickly reproducible and apply across the entire national territory within the defined budget envelope ». A very substantial budget in these times of crisis has even been released in the order of € 10,000,000 including tax, which aims to finance « one or more projects of interest. ».
What about the independence of this agency, the real nature of these « interest » projects selected, the profile of the people selected, and that of the « experts » composing the evaluation committee? Even as previously mentioned, the army has « experts » who have reported flaws in the logistics of the NRBC system, in terms of resources. What about the lack of appeal to specialists in disaster medicine, experts in judicial strategies, in the opinion of the evaluation committee by the Academy of Sciences …? Thus, we can read since April 7, 2020 on the website of the Directorate General of Armaments[50] : « Among the 1050 proposals of the call for projects launched by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, that of the Ile-de-France SME BforCure caught the attention of the Defense Innovation Agency (AID): the NOMORECOV project consists in developing a mobile, modular and connected for rapid detection of a coronavirus infection (in less than 30 minutes). The project, funded to the tune of 1.8 million euros by AID, will cover the development, test and qualification phases for obtaining a first prototype, expected within 6 months. Nomorecov ”aims to carry out reliable and rapid screening on the site of the samples, without resorting to the use of a centralized laboratory. BforCure has developed the Fastgene ™ diagnostic technology allowing PCR reactions to be carried out in around ten minutes and thus very quickly detect the presence of viruses.».
We are there at the heart of the traceability of a viral infection. And security crisis management. However, this question falls within the competence of real specialists in the matter, international as well as national, such as expert Jean-Luc Viruega, justice expert near the Court of Appeal of Montpellier. Or virologists and epidemiologists, and specialists in disaster doctors.
So with this reading that some would find edifying, can we be entitled to ask the question of why the device chosen, if it is truly revolutionary, was not highlighted by the SME itself from the beginning of the crisis. Simply to have the merit of saving some 50,000 people across Europe … Why did you hear the call for projects?
Knowing that the company selected has existed since 2018 « by swarming of the company ELVESYS, which designs and develops innovative bio-detection solutions intended for the medical and industrial environment ». That on reading its own site, it was created by « two engineering directors, co-founders of several innovative companies in the fields of microfluidics and biotechnologies (Elvesys, 4DCell, Cherrybiotech, etc.) ». Including a « former head of the CBRN departments in the public and private sectors ». And that it would work since « Since 2013 », with the General Directorate of Armament (DGA) and then the AID who « financed, via various innovation support devices, the maturation of the Fastgene ™ technology owned by Reinforcement ».
So, at the time of death, shortages of masks, exhausted nursing staff and order services, and disastrous economic consequences, this important information risks displeasing. And to increase the distrust of the state, which has already been present since the events of the yellow vests. Perhaps then one would think that it would not be unreasonable for the Senate as the National Assembly to open a parliamentary inquiry allowing to assess the modalities of granting these calls for projects so expensive, by verifying the ethical issues of collusion, conflicts of interest when it was possible to call on field specialists present in effective systems.
2- Suggestion of a strategy based on transversal environmental interconnection
In the Middle Ages as in certain tribes still, the epidemic was regarded as a punishment of God. Today, some like Nicolas Hulot define it as an « ultimatum of nature ». We can therefore wonder whether environmental concerns will become national and international priorities in the aftermath of covid-19. Faced with the imperatives of reviving the productive apparatuses. However, the States have realized that current economic modes are at the very source of the sanitary turpitudes currently undergone and that the appeal of Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the UN, to a Is the global “general cease-fire” nothing other than a modernized request to the truces of God of the Middle Ages? This truce has allowed a temporary lull in war zones and historic agreements like that relating to the decline in the barrel of oil. However, logistical difficulties have been undermined since March 2020 for counterterrorism service interventions, peace support missions, mediations or international inspections. The necessary global economic recovery leads to health questions. The strategic expediency of actors, particularly terrorists, must therefore be watched because the international community is concentrating on the pandemic and its capacity to act is reduced by the very fact of this health crisis, which has too quickly been called a “war”. Opportunism also manifests itself in domestic politics, with suspicious dismissals, and major reforms that went unnoticed (constitutional reform in Russia, strengthening of the powers of Mohamed ben Salman in Saudi Arabia, concentration of powers in Hungary …)
[1] Convention adopted entered into force on October 30, 2001, ratified by France on July 8, 2002 and entered into force on October 6, 2002
[2] Access to environmental information – Participation in the decision-making process – Access to justice..
[3] Christian Huygens De ratiociniis in alea ludo 1657
[4] Order of June 30, 2010 establishing the list of micro-organisms and toxins provided for in article L. 5139-1 of the public health code
[5] Virus Arenaviridae (virus Lassa- virus Machupo-virus Sabia) ; virus Bunyaviridae ; virus Hantavirus (virus Andes) ; virus Nairovirus (virus de la fièvre hémorragique de Crimée/Congo) ; virus Filoviridae (virus Ebola, virus Marburg) ; virus Paramyxoviridae (virus Hendra, virus Nipah) ; virus Poxviridae (virus de la variole, virus de l’orthopoxvirose simienne) ; virus coronaviridae (coronavirus responsable du syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère (SRAS)
[6] In action since 2010 (after Piratox, Piratome et Biotox government plans)
[7] Sheet 1 – What to do in an emergency situation before identifying the responsible pathogen; Sheet 2 – Coal; Sheet 3 – Plague; Sheet 4 -Tularemia; Sheet 5 – Brucellosis; Sheet 6 – Agents; fevers; viral hemorrhagics; Sheet 7 – Smallpox; Sheet 8 – Botulinum toxin; Sheet 9 – Q fever; Sheet 10 – Snot and melioidosis; Sheet 11 – Other bacterial infections; Sheet 12 – Other biological agents; Anthrax or anthrax disease summary sheet (Prs Brouqui & Delmont)
[8] http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/a_to_i/6th_meeting/Presentations/6TFAI_2a_6_CIDCE_Singla.pdf
https://www.unece.org/index.php?id=50574
[9] Decision n ° 2020-854 QPC of April 3, 2020
[10] CE. judgment of 29 april 2002
[11] Cf note 8
[12] Lebanese-American writer, statistician, essayist specializing in epistemology of probability and practitioner of financial mathematics
[13] « interconnected complex systems have some attributes that allow some things to cascade out of control, delivering extreme outcomes » (Nassim Nicholas Taleb & Yaneer Bar-Yam, « The UK’s coronavirus policy may sound scientific. It isn’t », The Guardian, 25 mars 2020)
[14] September 1918 – april 1919
[15] Guillaume Apollinaire, Egon Schiele, Rodrigues Alves
[16] May 1968- march 1970
[17] November 2002- juillet 2003
[18] 2009-2010
[19] Wealth Mondial Organisation
[20] https://www.who.int/fr/
[21] international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction or CIAC of September 3, 1992 entered into force on April 29, 1997
[22] Chimical, Biologic, Radiologic Nuclear device
[23] Nuclear, radiologic, biologic, chemical
[24] Ulrich Beck, : a risk society, Aubie editions, 2001
[25] NUGA, A/RES/44/236. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, 22th décember 1989
[26] https://www.who.int/csr/disease/fr/
[27] The Beaufort scale (classification of wind intensity); The improved Fujita scale (ranking of tornado strength); The Saffir-Simpson scale (classification of the intensity of cyclones); Torro scale (classification of tornado intensity); The Mercalli scale (classification of the intensity of earthquakes); Richter scale (magnitude of earthquakes); The Inès scale (communication tool designed to facilitate public information on nuclear and radiological events
[28] René Noto, Pierre Huguenard, Alain Larcan, Medicine of catastrophe, Masson editions, 1994; Henri Julien, Manual of disaster medicine, Lavoisier editions, 2017, 992 pages
[29] Matthieu Langlois, Frédéric Ploquin, RAID doctors : leave in emergency state, Albin Michel éditions, 2016
[30] law n ° 2004-811 of August 13, 2004 of modernization of the civil security
[31] https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/Securite-civile/Documentation-technique/Les-sapeurs-pompiers/La-reglementation-incendie/La-commission-centrale-de-securite-CCS/Avis-de-la-commission-centrale-de-se-curite-CCS-en-2013
[32] Circular No. 700 / SGDSN / PSE / PSN of October 2, 2018 relating to the national doctrine for the use of emergency and medical means in the face of a terrorist action using chemical materials
- [33] Decree No. 2014-338 of March 14, 2014
[34] https://www.missionnrbc-zoneouest.fr/formation-entrainement/entrainements-exercices/entrainement-interministeriel-zonal/
[35] https://www.sfmc.eu/evenement/session-nrbc-ensosp-cncmfe-et-sfmc-aix-en-povence/
[36] Example of NRBC interministerial training in the south-west zone from 27 and 28 September 2017 on the air base (BA) 120 in Cazaux, the main objective of which is to enable the services of the various ministries contributing to the protection and security of populations (gendarmerie and national police, departmental firefighters fire and rescue services, SAMU and armies)
[37] décision n°10066/DEF/EMA/MA/DNBC of 7 august 2013
[38] Instruction n° 505287/DEF/EMAT/PP/B.PLANS/NRBC relating to the attributions and the organization of the joint center for nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical defense.
[39] Colonel Laurent GIOT, commander of the CIA2 – NRBC- CDEC / DDO – LETTER DU RETEX – OPERATIONS n ° 32 – March 2017
[40] Loi n° 87-565 du 22/07/87 relative à l’organisation de la sécurité civile, à la protection de la forêt contre l’incendie et à la prévention des risques majeurs
[41] Loi n° 95-101 du 2 février 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de l’environnement
[42] LOI n°2012-1460 du 27 décembre 2012 – art. 6
[43] https://www.jouve.com/news/know-your-patient-la-nouvelle-offre-sante-de-jouve-pour-lhopital/
[44] « S.A.R.R.A », David Gruson, Editions Beta Publisher, Tome I publié en 2018, Tome II publié en 2019
[45] Laure SINGLA, environmental conflicts regulation and médiation in XXI st century : advocacy for a bio-responsible legal vision, PUP editions, 2020
[46] Naomi KLEIN, the shock strategy: the rise of disaster capitalism, translated into French, 2008, Actes Sud editions
[47] Decree No. 1764 of December 30, 2005 on the organization of the health system in the event of a serious health threat; Guide for the use of NRBC assistants from 03.04.2013
[48] http://www.senat.fr/rap/r18-655/r18-65517.html
[49] AID call for applications March 2020
[50] https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga